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My central argument is that “family” entertainment is not merely the most 
visible manifestation of the Hollywood studios’ ethos of global expansion 
(see Miller et al, 2005), but, moreover, that it is absolutely central to their 
industrial and commercial identities.  Previous scholars (Allen, 1999; 
Krämer, 1998, 2002, 2004, 2006) have touched on this point.  Peter 
Krämer, for example, has correctly emphasised the commercial 
importance of contemporary Hollywood “family” films, pointing out that 
such products are “at the very heart of today’s media conglomerates and 
indeed today’s popular culture” (2002: 96).  Similarly, in 1999, Robert C. 
Allen published a provocative essay that positioned the “family film” as 
the “earliest and clearest expression” of “the rise of post-Hollywood 
cinema” (127).  For both writers, the operations of the contemporary 
Hollywood studios are shaped not only by the needs of the box office, but 
also the ability, and the need, to exploit products across numerous 
horizontally integrated platforms.  What has become known corporately 
and popularly as “family” entertainment provides the best chance of 
commercial success across platforms ranging from theatrical exhibition, 
television and home video to video games, toys and other forms of 
merchandise.  In this essay, I would like to expand upon previous 
accounts of “family” entertainment in two specific ways.  Firstly, I will 
demonstrate the extent to which “family” entertainment franchises have 
come to dominate the high-end operations of the major studios, 
especially since the mid-1990s.  Secondly, I will attempt to redress the 
significant under-appreciation of the ways in which the seemingly 
unbounded proliferation of “family” entertainment has closely mirrored 
industrial changes – namely conglomeration, global expansion, acquisition 
and synergy – among these diversified multimedia giants. 
The key difference between the Hollywood studios pre- and post-
conglomeration is the development of “family” entertainment.  The term 
“family entertainment” is used here to refer to a range of multimedia 
products commonly associated with children, but which also attempt to 
appeal to a much broader audience, transcending not merely 
demographic, but also cultural, barriers.  As typified by contemporary 
Hollywood entertainment franchises such as Harry Potter (2001-2011), 
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Toy Story (1995-2010), Shrek (2001-2010) and Chronicles of Narnia 
(2005-2010), “family” film narratives historically have been characterised 
by narrative transparency, spectacle, emotive qualities, an optimistic 
message (culminating in a “happy ending”) and broad audience suitability 
– altogether encompassing a commercially-motivated desire to please as 
many, and offend as few, potential consumers as possible (Brown, 2012).  
Although the Hollywood “family” film dates back to the early sound era 
(Ibid.), its current commercial dominance is largely a post-1980s 
phenomenon, as is the development of the “family”-orientated multimedia 
franchise.  Although some very useful research has been published on the 
subject, in general the centrality of post-Hollywood “family” 
entertainment has been sorely under-appreciated in the academy.  
Krämer has correctly observed that “most of Hollywood’s superhits” since 
the late-1970s are “children’s films for the whole family and for 
teenagers, too” (2004: 366-367).  Yet even Krämer, at times, 
underestimates its scope by defining the “family” film simply as 
entertainment “aimed at both children and their parents” (2002: 186).  It 
may well be (and we will not know this until the emergence of 
authoritative demographic and ethnographic audience research) that 
“families” – prototypically parents and children watching together – are 
still important consumers.  However, I would contend that this definition 
of the “family” film is now anachronistic, for two reasons. 
Firstly, as will be discussed, there has been a clear trend since the mid-
1990s to broaden the modes of appeal of “family” films beyond this core, 
traditional consumer group.  Contemporary “family” entertainment 
franchises are not merely trivial amusements for parents and their 
children, but are also globally-oriented mass media that target the 
broadest possible demographic and ethnographic cross-section.  
Secondly, “family” entertainment can no longer be understood solely in 
terms of a single, generative filmic text.  Most major “family” films 
generate multimedia franchises, while many are based on existing brands.  
Although Warner Bros.’ Harry Potter and Lord of the Rings film series 
derive from literary source material, Disney’s Pirates of the Caribbean 
(2003-2011) and Paramount and DreamWorks’ Transformers (2007-
2011) are “adapted” from nothing more substantive than a theme park 
ride and successful toy line, respectively.  In each case, however, their 
core brand images are widely accessible, possess an existing consumer 
base, and can be realised across various media – films, television, 
computer games, comic books, toys and other merchandise.  Hollywood 
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“family” entertainment, then, has developed to the point where it 
transcends cinematic typology. 
Commercial Dominance 
A short essay attempting to grapple with the nebulous but pervasive 
phenomenon of contemporary Hollywood “family” entertainment thus 
immediately encounters an obstacle: there is scant foundational literature 
on the subject – whether historical or theoretical – on which to build.  In 
spite of Krämer’s useful working definition of the “family film” (cited 
above), it is not altogether clear whether the “genre” should be defined 
chiefly in formal, commercial or industrial terms.  Whilst we should not 
rule out the possibility of a more traditionally text-based formulation that 
considers recurring narrative and structural patterns or ideological 
overtones, such a project would be a major undertaking.  Instead, for the 
purposes of this essay, I will understand “family films” in terms of what 
Steve Neale (following Lukow and Ricci) has called the “inter-textual 
relay.”  Inter-textual relays are the various “discourses of publicity, 
promotion and reception: that surround mainstream films and shape 
popular responses, including industry categories as well as trade and 
press reviews (2000: 2-3).   
The inter-textual relay provides scholars with an alternative means 
through which films can be categorised, one which, properly, in my view, 
places greater emphasis on labels used popularly and commercially.  
When we examine a list of the 30 most commercially successfully films in 
the history of commercial cinema (at the time of writing) in relation to 
these discourses, a striking figure emerges: 27 of them – or 90 per cent – 
have been marketed and/or widely received as “family” movies (“All Time 
Worldwide,” 2012).  By any measure, and even allowing for the fact that 
this figure may be inflated by promotional discourses designed to boost 
the audience-bases of the films in question, this is a remarkable statistic, 
one which testifies both to the immense material popularity of such 
entertainment and the considerable value of the “family” brand.  It should 
be noted that the table of films from which I draw this statistic does not 
take inflation into account, and, consequently, most of the films are post-
1990s releases, a fact which allows us to register the extent to which 
“family” films have come to dominate the international box office over the 
last two decades.   
Equally significant is the fact that all of these 30 films were produced 
and/or distributed by the “big six” major Hollywood studios (Walt Disney 
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Pictures, Warner Bros., Paramount, Twentieth Century Fox, Sony and 
Universal), which together comprise the trade association the Motion 
Picture Association of America (MPAA).  These studios account for the 
vast majority of international box office hits and major cinematic 
franchises, despite typically producing less than 30 per cent of all films 
distributed annually in the United States (“2009 MPAA,” 2009).  Of 
course, by no means would it be true to say that the major studios only 
produce or distribute “family” films, but that each of them endeavours to 
craft a handful of “high-concept” blockbuster “family” films annually that 
can be exploited on multiple levels, and thus develop into major 
franchises.  The MPAA member companies’ exert a near-hegemonic 
control over global film distribution, which, when combined with some 
highly protectionist policies, have ensured that rivals – both domestic and 
international – are effectively closed out of the world market. 
The blockbuster releases of each of these companies since the turn of the 
century have become increasingly standardised, both formally and in 
terms of their intended consumer base.  A growing proportion of 
mainstream films are rated PG or PG-13 by the MPAA, evidencing an 
ongoing embrace of the nebulous, pluralistic but undeniably lucrative 
international “family” market.  In 2004, a Harvard School of Public Health 
study observed that “a movie rated PG or PG-13 today has more sexual 
or violent content than a similarly rated movie in the past” and accused 
the MPAA of transgressing standards of acceptability in the “family”-
friendly ratings (i.e. G, PG and PG-13) (Waxman, 2004).  This suggests a 
broader renegotiation of the traditional parameters defining the “family” 
audience, beyond its “core” demographics of parents and children.  
Conversely, R-rated films, which ostensibly prevent pre-teen and young 
teenage audiences from attending without adult supervision, and which 
“were once the studios’ mainstay,” are reputedly “on the decline, both in 
numbers and in lure” (Snyder, 2005).  However, a closer examination 
reveals that the overall proportion of films rated R has remained relatively 
stable at just under 60 per cent; the difference is that far fewer 
blockbusters are now released with an R rating (“Entertainment 
Industry”). 
In 1980, 55 per cent of the top 20 films of the year were R-rated; by 
1995, this figure had fallen to 30 per cent, and by 2009 to 10 per cent 
(“All Time Worldwide”).  Accordingly, among the current 30 highest-
grossing movies of all-time globally, none are rated R.  This trend towards 
“family-friendly” ratings contrasts dramatically with industry practice 
between the late 1960s and the early 1980s, when the R rating was 
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widely perceived as a marker of artistic credibility.  Conversely, 
notwithstanding notable exceptions such as the outputs of Disney, George 
Lucas, or Steven Spielberg, for example, the “family”-friendly ratings 
were more typically seen as a virtual guarantee of commercial oblivion.  
In 1969, director Richard Sarafian openly complained when his film Run 
Wild, Born Free was identified by the press as a “family” movie 
(Goldstein, 1968).  Equally significant was the U.S. release of Chariots of 
Fire (1981), a case where the distributors inserted profanity into one 
scene precisely in order to avoid a potentially damaging G rating.  Today, 
as Jennifer Geer has observed, marketers are eager to represent their 
products as “family” entertainments, even when – as with the J. M. Barrie 
biopic Finding Neverland (2004) – the label is misleading or inappropriate 
(2007: 193-212).  While the R rating retains its connotations of 
independent-minded artistry, the days when a “family”-friendly rating was 
considered inimical to commercial success are long gone.  One Hollywood 
marketing executive wryly suggested: “you’re leaving tens of millions of 
dollars on the table with an R rating.  Why? For artistic integrity? Get 
real” (Snyder, 2005).     
One of the ways in which the Hollywood studios consciously attempted to 
broaden public perceptions of “family” entertainment during the mid-
1980s was the advent of the PG-13 rating.  Introduced by the MPAA 
following protests in the US that Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom 
(1984) was too violent to fit the PG criteria, PG-13 is a buffer between PG 
and R, purporting to allow entry for children under the age of thirteen 
only if accompanied by an adult.  A PG or PG-13 rating has become 
almost a prerequisite for live-action blockbuster success.  More than 60 
per cent of the top 30 films of all-time fall into PG-13, a rating which has 
been applied to such unambiguously “family-oriented” films as The 
Simpsons Movie (2007), The Golden Compass (2007) and Harry Potter 
and the Order of the Phoenix (2007) (“All Time Worldwide,” 2012).  
However, many of the 27 all-time hits identified by their inter-textual 
relays as “family” entertainment would perhaps not have been regarded 
as such by previous generations, notably The Avengers (2012) and the 
Transformers film series.  Although there were criticisms in the US that 
the first Transformers film, which contained considerable violent content, 
was being marketed to young children, such protests were chiefly low-
level (Tiemann, 2007). 
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Industrial Centrality 
Although the current centrality of “family” entertainment is strongly linked 
with the conglomeration and consequent global agenda of the Hollywood 
studios, its proliferation has been abetted by a broader and progressive 
cultural receptiveness to “juvenile” entertainment since the late 1970s, 
particularly in North America.  By 1976, 62 per cent of US audiences were 
aged between 16 and 29, and between 1977 and 1979, there was a 
further increase of 8 per cent in the quantity of tickets sold to the 12-to-
20 age group (Edgerton, 1983: 175; Cook, 2000: 23).  However, this is 
not to say that adult audiences abandoned the movie-going habit.  
Allegedly, the main consumers of Spielberg’s E.T. (1982) in the US were 
not children, but childless couples in their twenties and thirties (Morris, 
2007: 85).  The multiplex theatre, which became the predominant mode 
of exhibition after the 1970s, also provided the economies of scale 
necessary to fully exploit blockbusters (Gomery, 2005: 213-19). 
Janet Wasko has claimed that the ensuing standardisation is the result of 
rival companies attempting “to emulate the Disney model” (Wasko, 1994: 
34), but this observation is suspect.  In fact, it was the spectacular 
success of Fox’s Star Wars (1977-2005) and Warner’s Superman (1978-
2006) franchises that signalled the generic transition from a more varied 
(but still undeniably adult-inflected) mainstream entertainment 
programme to an increasingly “family”-oriented model.  Star Wars in 
particular – as Krämer has argued – established a rough template for 
subsequent “family-adventure” franchises (2004: 366-367).  After Lucas’s 
Star Wars, “merchandising became an industry unto itself, and tie-in 
product marketing began to drive the conception and selling of motion 
picture products rather than vice versa” (Cook: 51).  But although Star 
Wars was a turning point aesthetically, the real industrial breakthrough – 
which is at least as significant, but considerably less understood – 
occurred during the early 1990s. 
Hollywood “family” entertainment since the early 1990s is conterminous 
with corporate strategies of vertical and horizontal expansion.  In spite of 
some immensely profitable “family” entertainment franchises, the actual 
volume of “family” films as a percentage of total output remained 
comparatively low during the 1980s.  What I call the structural centrality 
of “family” entertainment was initiated as a result of behind-the-scenes 
deal-making and industrial realignment.  Between the mid-1980s and 
mid-1990s, all of the major Hollywood studios except Disney were either 
acquired by larger multinational corporations or merged with other media 
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companies to create the diversified, international media conglomerates 
that exist today.  The first wave of Hollywood media conglomeration 
began in 1962, when MCA acquired Universal, but a more significant 
movement took place between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s.  In 1985, 
Turner Broadcasting purchased MGM, while News Corporation acquired 
Twentieth Century-Fox.  Columbia was bought by Coca-Cola, which then 
re-sold to Sony in 1989.  The same year, Warner Bros. merged with 
Time-Life to form Time-Warner, and in 1993, Viacom acquired 
Paramount.  This industrial process of conglomeration continues to this 
day.  Among the “classical” Hollywood majors, only Disney – a company 
that has continued to expand both vertically and horizontally – has 
resisted takeover (this is due, in large part, to the fact that its expansion 
and diversification has always been based on the “family” entertainment 
model).  It is no coincidence that these media mergers coincided with an 
upsurge in films and franchises with purportedly “universal” appeal that 
could, theoretically, be realised across multiple media platforms, targeting 
an increasingly accessible world market. 
In 1991, Time-Warner announced plans to create a “family film” 
production division.  With hindsight, this was a development of the utmost 
significance, yet it aroused very little surprise in the industry or the trade 
press.  Variety observed that it reflected “industry-wide awareness that 
survival in the 1990s may be a matter of creating wholesome, family-
oriented entertainment,” and that similar discussions regarding 
“increasing production of family films, if not creating family film divisions” 
were ongoing at Universal, Paramount, TriStar and Columbia (“New Plan,” 
1991).  The same article noted that Peter Guber, then head of production 
at Sony, was “seriously interested in pursuing programming that has 
strong family appeal,” partly because of the growing value of so-called 
“aftermarket business” such as home video (Ibid).  By this point, the 
development of specialised “family film” divisions, which were intended to 
produce movies beyond run-of-the-mill theatrical product, evidently was 
considered logical, if not inevitable, given the increasing box office value 
of “family” entertainment, coupled with the progressively global outlook of 
the Hollywood conglomerates. 
By 1993, Warner Bros. and Twentieth Century Fox had “family film” 
divisions in operation (Moerk, 1993; O’Steen, 1993).  As Warners 
executive Rob Friedman explained, “the industry has identified a growing 
family audience […] the baby boomers are now parents, and the family 
orientation is growing as a business” (Moerk, 1993).  Disney’s Tom 
Deegan responded: “the family market has always been there, but 
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Hollywood has just chosen to ignore it in the past” (Ibid).  Universal, 
Sony, and Paramount followed suit by opening their own specialist 
“family” units in 1998, 1999 and 2002, and in 2007 Universal created a 
specialised independent animation unit, Illumination (Sandler, 1998; Cox 
and Littleton, 1999; Lyons and Dunkley, 2002; Fleming, 2008).  The 
magnitude of the industry’s attitudinal shift regarding “family” 
entertainment was underscored when Disney divested itself of its left-
field, “indie” subsidiary Miramax in July 2010 in order to channel its 
energies on its “family” entertainment operations (Littleton, 2010).  In 
1986, the same company had created Touchstone, an “adult film” 
subsidiary, in order to escape the creative and brand-related restrictions 
of “family” programming. 
Political, sociological and commercial interest in the “family” was also high 
in the US during the early 1990s.  Some “baby boomer” executives even 
went so far as to identify a moral compunction to produce wholesome 
“family” fare in what they saw as an age of violence and uncertainty 
(Dare, 1994).  A more tangible motivation, however, was an influential 
report by Paul Kagan Associates advocating greater production of “family” 
entertainment (Murphy, 1993).  By 1994, such unlikely figures as Chuck 
Norris and Roger Corman were jumping on the bandwagon and trying to 
establish footholds in the “family” market, utilising the potentialities of 
direct-to-video production (aka “kidvids”) (Dare, 1994).  By the mid-
1990s, the effects of media conglomeration on film form were becoming 
increasingly apparent.  Mid-level “adult” productions were scaled down in 
favour of a smaller volume of “family”-suitable “event” films.  This was a 
major turning point.  Since 1995, as Richard Maltby has observed, 
Hollywood’s output has fallen almost exclusively into two categories: “big-
budget international movies and smaller-budget movies with less 
dependence on the international market” (2003: 223).  The fact that 
profitable overseas markets were opening up – such as post-Soviet Russia 
and post-economic-“liberalisation” India – was an added incentive: why 
make “family” films only for North American consumers when a huge 
global market was waiting to be addressed? 
Accordingly, this period marked the decline of the “traditional” “family” 
film.  One Sony executive announced, portentously: “the death of the 
family movie – that is the footnote for summer 1996.” Twentieth Century 
Fox executive Bill Mechanic explained: 
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We made a strategic move to get out of the kid business, as we’ve 
known it, a year ago.  Kid-oriented movies have been in trouble.  
[The] Nutty Professor [1996] and Independence Day [1996] have 
become the kid movies, the new family films. (Brennan, 1996) 
Disney’s Joe Roth traced the beginnings of this shift to the Lucas-
Spielberg collaboration Raiders of the Lost Ark (1981); this was, he 
claimed, “the beginning and the end of family films in America” (Ibid).  
This remark encapsulates the new reality of “family” entertainment: the 
highly culturally-specific “dual” appeal that characterised “family” films 
until the 1970s has been supplanted by a more escapist, 
“undifferentiated” mode of audience address. 
Whilst we must not overlook the fact that Hollywood’s international 
dominance stems partially from its so-called “competitive advantages” on 
the world stage, neither can we ignore the undoubted global appeal of the 
entertainment values it packages and exports.  An ever-expanding global 
consumer base has underpinned Hollywood’s embrace of a less culturally 
specific aesthetic since the turn of the century.  In 2008, The Golden 
Compass made the headlines as the first film to gross $300 million in 
overseas revenue without hitting $100 million in North America, a fact 
that was attributed to foreign distributors marketing it more effectively as 
a “family” movie than domestic marketers (Dawtry, 2008).  On a purely 
practical level, international audiences attend fewer movies than their US 
counterparts (McNary, 2008).  As a result, they tend to privilege “event” 
movies with “family” (that is, mass) suitability.  The plurality of global 
“family” audiences is reflected by the thematic and stylistic diversity of 
contemporary “family” films, which encompass various live-action and 
animated genres, as well as the expanding range of films – such as The 
Adventures of Tintin (2011) – which mine the convergence between these 
traditionally dichotomous formats. 
Increasingly, industrial and synergistic considerations impact directly on 
the generic and formal composition of mainstream Hollywood films.  
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the wholesale proliferation of 
fantasy subjects, which have formed the basis of the majority of “family” 
blockbusters since the millennium.  There are three primary reasons why 
fantasies are particularly attractive subjects for globally-oriented “family” 
films.  Firstly, fantasy is a highly visual form that presents an ideal 
pretext for the kinds of visual-orientated appeal demanded by 
international consumers.  Secondly, because its horizons are generally 
non-terrestrial, fantasy subjects are freed from the socio-cultural 
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specificity that may alienate non-Western audiences.  The Lord of the 
Rings and Harry Potter franchises, although inevitably retaining Western 
emphases, are not as clearly “American” in origin as, say, Star Wars or 
Indiana Jones.  Disney executive Mark Zoradi argues that “the fantasy 
genre travels exceptionally well, partly because there’s nothing that 
makes it geographically unique […] and its themes are pretty universal – 
good vs. evil, loyalty, the family sticking together” (McNary, 2008). 
Thirdly – and most importantly, from my perspective – a richly detailed 
fictional world affords almost limitless opportunities for merchandise and 
other tie-ins.  What David Bordwell has termed “world-building” is central 
to Hollywood’s treatment of fantasy.  “World-building” describes the 
intricate construction of a fictional universe, intended to imbue fantasy 
narratives with as much depth and identification as possible, and although 
it can be traced as far back as 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968), it has 
reached its apotheosis in more recent fantasy franchises (Thompson, 
2007: 84).  As Paul Grainge has observed, Warner Bros., with its stake in 
the Harry Potter and Lord of the Rings franchises, led the way in world-
building at the turn of the millennium “with serials, spin-offs and genres 
that were based quite specifically on the filmic realisation of a pre-sold, 
inveterately marketable, narrative universe” (2008: 59).  The active 
viewer participates through recapitulation, via word-of-mouth, social 
networks and fan clubs, and by purchasing the merchandise, thereby 
significantly extending the life of the media franchise.  Such processes of 
cross-media interdependency sustain the post-Hollywood studios, and 
provide justification for yet more industrial deal-making. 
Expansionism and Synergistic Dimensions 
It must be stressed that “family” entertainment can be understood at 
least as much in terms of corporate infrastructure as consumer products.  
“Family” entertainment is the material manifestation of a broader 
universalistic agenda; conglomeration, expansionism and synergy are the 
equivalent corporate manifestations.  They are two sides of the same 
coin.  As the eye-popping costs involved in bringing high-profile “family” 
films such as Avatar (2009) or Alice in Wonderland (2010) to fruition 
would suggest, the stakes are high.  The same is true of industrial 
expansionist strategies.  Some of the most notable media acquisitions of 
recent years – including Disney’s acquisition of Pixar Animation Studios 
for $7.4 billion in 2006, of Marvel for $4 billion in 2009, and of LucasFilm 
for $4 billion in 2012 – were motivated by the need to generate additional 
synergistic outlets and licensable properties in the pursuit of the global 
                                                   “Family Entertainment” and Contemporary Hollywood 
 
Issue 25, February 2013  11 
 
“family” market.  Although costly in the extreme, the executives who 
oversee these corporate developments are convinced that they are sound 
investments.  In the aftermath of the Pixar deal, Disney executive Dick 
Cook enthused: “you can’t come close to calculating what [this 
acquisition] means in the long term for the company in terms of new 
characters, stories, and lands for films and parks and publishing and 
more” (Fritz, 2007).  Disney CEO Bob Iger espoused similar rhetoric in 
relation to the LucasFilm acquisition, predicting that the ownership of Star 
Wars, “one of the greatest family entertainment franchises of all time,” 
will “give us a great footprint in consumer products globally” (Graser, 
2012).     
Some of the most visible cross-media synergies in recent years have been 
comic book tie-ins.  The comic book adaptation emerged as a sub-genre 
of the wider superhero movie boom that began with X-Men (2000) and 
continued with the Spider-Man (2002-2012) and Batman (2005-2012) 
series, as well as Hulk (2003), Fantastic Four (2005), Superman Returns 
(2006) and The Avengers.  Most superhero movies have found their 
inspiration directly from the back catalogues of Marvel and DC Comics, 
and considering the large, hitherto-unexploited range of licensable 
characters these companies own, it is scarcely surprising that they 
became desirable targets for acquisition (Graser, 2009).  Paramount, 
Sony and Fox already have long-term distribution deals based on 
superhero characters, with Sony holding the rights to Spider-Man and Fox 
to X-Men and Fantastic Four.  Irrespective of the cinematic longevity of 
the superhero cycle, the durability of these properties across different 
media – books, comics, action figures, computer games, theme park rides 
– ensures that the franchises will endure long after the movie cycle loses 
box office appeal.  A word has been invented to describe films that 
facilitate a reciprocally beneficial relationship with the toy market – 
“toyetic” (Hayes, 2008: 122).  The Transformers film franchise – co-
produced by Hasbro, Paramount and DreamWorks – is carefully designed 
to cut across demographics, exploiting not only nostalgia for Hasbro’s 
original toy line and the television show (1984-1987), but also the large 
number of adults who still buy toys themselves.  An 8 per cent rise in the 
sales of action figures in 2008 was attributed partly to higher sales of 
merchandise based on R-rated films (Thelman, 2008).  As Variety notes, 
“adult toybuyers don’t just drive toy sales, they drive enthusiasm that can 
be turned into films” (Ibid).   
Hollywood’s obsessive pursuit of synergy is matched only by its desire to 
exploit the commercial potential of pre-existing “family” brands.  Home 
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video has been integral to the diversified “family” entertainment franchise 
since its popularisation during the early 1980s, when “sell-through” – the 
policy of pricing the video cheaply in order to sell the maximum number 
of copies – became a popular strategy, especially with “family” films.  
Pinocchio’s entire run of 300,000 copies earned Disney $8 million 
(Wasser, 2002: 163-164).  However, it was not until the early 1990s that 
studios began manufacturing “kidvids.”  In 1994, Disney released The 
Return of Jafar, a direct-to-video sequel to its 1992 theatrical hit Aladdin.  
The venture was highly successful, selling over seven million copies, 
placing it within the top-ten all-time best-selling videos (Chanko, 1994).  
Direct-to-video animations can be made relatively cheaply.  The Return of 
Jafar cost approximately $6 million.  Producer-director Tad Stones 
admitted that “we didn’t have Disney’s best animators working on Jafar,” 
but pointed out that “you don’t compare a TV movie-of-the-week to 
Schindler’s List” (Ibid).  Direct-to-video has since become common 
industry practice; unsurprisingly so, when “even a modest-selling video 
premiere can generate $25 million-$50 million in revenue for a studio” 
(Hettrick, 2000).  This dominance accelerated as DVD replaced VHS as 
the leading home video technology.  By 2004, the annual revenue from 
“kidvids” had increased to $3 billion (Graser, 2004).  One of their major 
strengths is relative immunity to theatrical market forces, such as the 
industry recession of 2008-2009.  Sony marketing executive Marc Rashba 
has suggested that “family audiences, even in this sort of down market 
[…] continue to support family titles overall on DVD” (McLean, 2009). 
The assumption that the “family” film is the key foundational element in 
multimedia “family” franchises is no longer a safe one.  Several 
immensely profitable “family” franchises reached cinemas only after 
successful runs on cable television, most notably The SpongeBob 
SquarePants Movie (2004), and The Smurfs (2011).  Their success 
demonstrates that “family” entertainment franchises need not be uniform 
and formally conventional to achieve big success, but they do require 
easily accessible imagery and licensable material for ancillary exploitation.  
This fetishisation of the brand image perhaps reaches its fullest extension 
with the Pirates of the Caribbean franchise, which, prior to its successful 
narrativisation, traded exclusively on its renown as a Disneyland theme 
park ride.  In recent years, high-profile movie “adaptations” of Disney 
theme park rides “Jungle Cruise” and “Haunted Mansion” have also been 
announced, as well as a film set in “The Magic Kingdom” itself 
(McClintock, 2010).  A Ridley Scott-directed film adaptation of the board 
game Monopoly (in association with Hasbro) is currently in development, 
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and there have even been discussions concerning a movie based on the 
Rubik’s Cube (Shoard, 2010).  Such cross-media tie-ins are regularly 
dismissed as indicative of the creative bankruptcy of the contemporary 
Hollywood studios, but this is to overlook the fact that creativity and 
originality are necessarily subservient to the economic capital of 
successfully exploiting pre-sold, universally intelligible brand images.  
According to Universal Pictures Chairman Marc Shmuger, “brands are the 
new stars,” and brands associated with the “family” market are the most 
valuable of all (Fritz, 2009).  Cross-media deal-making of this nature is 
based on the conviction that there is no such thing as a closed market, 
either demographically or geographically.  
The conventional wisdom – largely propounded by the media industry 
itself – is that “synergy” is vital to the success of internationally popular 
franchises.  A synergy can be defined as “a financial benefit, to either the 
top or bottom line, attainable only through a particular corporate 
combination,” and is often one of the key drivers behind corporate 
mergers and acquisitions (Knee, Greenwald and Seave, 2009: 213).  
Synergy is an extension of the capitalistic paradigm of growth and 
expansion that underpins mainstream Hollywood cinema.  It is perceived 
as one of the primary commercial engines of the global visual media 
business.  In 2002, Universal executives Scott Stuber and Mary Parent 
asserted that “if you can have a product that can be realised across many 
different avenues of the company, it has more than one shot at success” 
(Bing and Dunkley, 2002).  Of necessity, much of my examination of 
contemporary “family” entertainment in this essay has centred on its 
potential profitability.  However, as with all business strategies, there is 
the potential for failure, and because of the vast sums of money at stake, 
failure tends to be highly damaging.  Disney’s Mars Needs Moms (2011), 
which recouped less than one-third of its estimated $150 million budget, 
made headlines as one of the most spectacular box-office flops in cinema 
history.  However, media underperformance as a result of corporate 
strategies of growth and expansion is even more damaging, and much 
less visible.  Media economists Jonathan Knee, Bruce Greenwald and Ava 
Seave cite a number of prominent media mergers and acquisitions that 
failed to yield any perceptible synergistic benefits, and identify such 
expansionist and universalistic strategies as primary markers of “bad 
mogul” behaviour (2009: 3).   
The record-breaking, headline-grabbing box office performances of, say, 
Avatar or the Harry Potter films, represent a glamorous and slightly 
misleading upside to a broader agenda of global media expansionism that 
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is, as often as not, marked by underperformance.  Disney, which is often 
represented as the model of the diversified, synergistically active, 
“family”-oriented, international media conglomerate, in fact provides a 
salient example of the potential dangers of this aggressively expansionist 
approach.  By the early 1980s, the company had lost its place in the 
theatrical “family” market, and a new corporate team, headed by Michael 
Eisner, assumed control.  Under Eisner’s leadership, Disney reinvented 
itself artistically with such hits as The Little Mermaid (1989), Beauty and 
the Beast (1991) and The Lion King (1994).  The company began 
outperforming its rivals – for a time.  Eisner gained renown as one of the 
earliest and most vocal industry proponents of synergy.  He set in place a 
“synergy boot camp” for divisional heads to reinforce that notion that 
Disney had to expand and diversify in order to survive (Ibid: 236-237).  
He also instituted a permanent “Synergy Group” to report to him directly, 
and insisted that “if you don’t have synergy, you have nothing but new 
products. […] If you have synergy, it goes on and on” (Allen, 1999: 121).  
A superficial analysis might detect a direct correlation between Disney’s 
outperformance during the late 1980s and early 1990s with Eisner’s 
insistence on synergy. 
However, a closer examination reveals that Disney’s resurgence had more 
to do with conservative cost-cutting and price-rising strategies. Moreover, 
the company’s subsequent difficulties, from the mid-1990s well into the 
new millennium, coincided with Eisner’s attempts to (over) extend the 
media conglomerate (Knee et al.: 236-237).  In 1995, he oversaw 
Disney’s most radical corporate realignment in decades: the acquisition of 
US television network ABC for an estimated $19 billion (Gomery, 2005: 
272).  It should have been the apotheosis of Eisner’s tenure at Disney, 
enabling a whole array of reciprocally beneficial synergies and tie-ins.  
However, not only did Disney significantly overpay for the acquisition and 
begin underperforming as a result, but Knee, Greenwald and Seave have 
argued that the deal “seemed to undermine the profitability of both ABC’s 
broadcast network and Disney’s filmed entertainment operations” (Knee 
et al, 2009: 236-237).  Such examples of underperformance are not 
isolated.  They are, however, often overlooked by the trade and general-
interest media, which are more interested in presenting a simplistically 
attractive, and marketable, image of blockbuster hits and easily digestible 
box office statistics.   
My key argument – that the post-Hollywood studios are pursuing a global 
expansionist agenda based on the “family” entertainment model – thus 
can be related to one of the major debates in business and economic 
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studies, namely the relative merits of a “local” and a “global” capitalist 
framework.  Clearly, these international media conglomerates do not 
believe – as do Knee, Greenwald and Seave – that “all profitable media is 
local” (2009: 169).  Their very identity, which at its heart is predicated on 
the capitalistic ethos of continued growth and expansion, proves 
otherwise.  Indeed, Hollywood’s advancements in emerging global 
markets such as China and Russia over the last two decades have been 
achieved primarily with mass-appeal “family” films.  However, there is 
obvious recognition that broad-appeal “family” movies cannot appeal to 
everyone, least of all to those people who desire entertainment that 
reflects their own social and behavioural values.  Presently, “family” films 
are achieving their purpose extremely well, keeping the major Hollywood 
studios’ share of the global box office at around 60 per cent (Rickey, 
2010).  But there seems to be increasing awareness that true global 
domination also requires products individually tailored towards local 
markets.  Advancements into foreign territories have been particularly 
successful in countries such as Russia, but less so in the larger, more 
profitable Indian and Chinese markets (Arango, 2009).  Furthermore, 
although Disney’s advancement into India with the acquisition of film 
studio UTV Motion Pictures constitutes a clear attempt to appeal to “local” 
as well as “global” audiences, its (ill-fated) decision to produce a 
Hollywood-style, big-budget CGI-animated “family” blockbuster, Arjun: 
The Warrior Prince (2012), suggests a long-term desire to boost the 
receptivity of this international market to its more universalistic, English-
language productions (“Walt Disney, UTV,” 2011).  Therefore, in some 
cases at least, what initially appears a point of departure from the global 
“family” entertainment agenda in fact constitutes an extension of it.    
 “Family” entertainment can no longer be regarded merely as a “cycle” or 
even a “trend” in Hollywood cinema.  Those terms falsely imply a state of 
transience or impermanence.  Rather, the modern media conglomerates 
are now structurally committed to the production and exploitation of 
globalised “family” entertainment.  This, of course, is not to suggest that 
“adult”-oriented filmmaking is in terminal decline, or that it will disappear 
entirely.  There will always be demand for the sophisticated, the 
provocative, the perverse.  The major studios continue to distribute such 
entertainment as long as costs can be kept sufficiently low, in the hope of 
a “runaway” hit.  However, there is an undoubted trend of marginalisation 
of such entertainment from the mainstream arena, particularly in North 
American cinema.  Of course, the evidence offered here is only the tip of 
a very large iceberg, and there is a clear need for more in-depth research 
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on the key points raised in this essay.  In 2002, Krämer pointed out that 
“family” films are “very low on the academic agenda, at least in film 
studies” (2002: 185), and sadly this attitude has changed little in the 
intervening years.  In order to come to terms with this most important 
facet of contemporary mass media culture, we must first acknowledge the 
centrality of “family” entertainment.  That is, we cannot continue to view 
the “family” film merely as one genre among many, and not even as the 
dominant mode of production.  Instead, “family” films must be 
understood as constituents of broader entertainment franchises that serve 
as the very foundation upon which the modern, post-Hollywood media 
conglomerates are built. 
 
Bibliography 
Allen, Robert C. (1999) Home Alone Together: Hollywood and the 
“Family” Film, in Melvyn Stokes and Richard Maltby (eds.), Identifying 
Hollywood’s Audiences: Cultural Identity and the Movies.  London: BFI 
Publishing, pp. 109-34. 
All Time Worldwide Box Office Grosses (2012) Box Office Mojo [online].  
Available at http://boxofficemojo.com/alltime/world/ [Accessed: 26 June 
2012]  
Arango, Tim (2009) US Media See a Path to India in China’s Snub, The 
New York Times [online], 3 May.  Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/business/media/04media.html 
[Accessed: 23 March 2010] 
Bing, Jonathan and Cathy Dunkley (2002) Kiddy Litter Rules H’Wood: 
Tyke Tomes Ascendant in Studios’ Post-Potter Parade, Variety [online], 8 
January.  Available at: 
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117858043.html [Accessed: 19 
October 2009] 
Bose, Derek (2006) Brand Bollywood: A New Global Entertainment Order.  
New Delhi: Sage India. 
Brennan, Judy (1996) Summer School Lessons; Families Didn’t Flock to 
Movies That Were Aimed at Children, Los Angeles Times, 12 September, 
p. F1. 
Brown, Noel (2012) The Hollywood Family Film: A History, From Shirley 
Temple to Harry Potter.  London and New York: I.B. Tauris. 
                                                   “Family Entertainment” and Contemporary Hollywood 
 
Issue 25, February 2013  17 
 
Chanko, Kenneth M. (1994) Who Says a Movie Sequel Can’t be Made for 
Home Video?, New York Times [online] 19 June.  Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/19/movies/film-who-says-a-movie-
sequel-can-t-be-made-for-home-video.html [Accessed: 17 October 2009] 
Chopra, Anupama (2009) Stumbling Toward Bollywood, New York Times 
[online], 20 March.  Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/22/movies/22chop.html [Accessed: 23 
March 2010] 
Cook, David A. (2000) Lost Illusions: American Cinema in the Shadow of 
Watergate and Vietnam, 1970-1979.  Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Cox, Dan and Cynthia Littleton (1999) Sony in Family Way: New Division 
Aimed at Kid-Friendly Pix, TV Fare, Variety [online], 26 February.  
Available at: http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117491707.html 
[Accessed: 16 October 2009] 
Dare, Michael (1994) Majors Now Minor in Family Pix Divisions, Variety, 
30 June, pp. 10, 28. 
Dawtry, Adam (2008) “Compass” Spins Foreign Frenzy: Film’s Overseas 
Success Raises Questions in US, Variety, 10 March, p. 7. 
Edgerton, Gary R. (1983) American Film Exhibition and an Analysis of the 
Motion Picture Industry’s Market Structure 1963-1980.  New York: 
Garland Publishing. 
Entertainment Industry Market Statistics (2007) Motion Picture 
Association of America, p. 13. 
Fleming, Michael (2008) Meledandri, Universal Team on Deals: 
Illumination Puts Focus on Family Fare, Variety [online], 5 March.  
Available at: http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117981911.html 
[Accessed: 16 October 2009] 
Fritz, Ben (2007) Disney Animation Gets Pixar-ization: Catmull Thinks a 
Radical Shift is Needed, Variety [online], 24 February.  Available at: 
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117960093.html [Accessed: 29 
September 2009] 
_____ (2009) Hollywood Sees Star Qualities in Classic Games and Toys, 
Los Angeles Times [online], 28 September.  Available at: 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-ct-brands28-
2009sep28,0,1264698.story [Accessed: 1 October 2009] 
Brown   
   
18   Issue 25, February 2013 
 
Geer Jennifer (2007) J. M. Barrie Gets the Miramax Treatment: Finding 
(and Marketing) Neverland, Children’s Literature Association Quarterly, 
Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 193-212. 
Goldstein, Norman (1968) “Family” Tag Irks Director of “Colt,” Los 
Angeles Times, 12 November, p. C17. 
Gomery, Douglas (2005) The Hollywood Studio System: A History.  
London: BFI Publishing. 
Grainge, Paul (2008) Brand Hollywood: Selling Entertainment in a Global 
Media Age.  London: Routledge. 
Graser, Marc (2004) H’Wood’s Direct Hits: DVD Preems Boffo, But Biz 
Frets over Sequel-Mania, Variety, 13 September, p. 1. 
______ (2009) Warner Bros. Creates DC Entertainment: Studio Taps 
Premiere Exec Diane Nelson as Chief, Variety [online], 9 September.  
Available at: http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118008299.html 
[Accessed: 29 September 2009] 
______ (2012) Disney Buys LucasFilm, New “Star Wars” Planned, Variety 
[online], 30 October.  Available at: 
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118061434 [Accessed 1 November 
2012] 
Hayes, Dade (2008) Anytime Playdate: Inside the Preschool 
Entertainment Boom, or How Television Became My Baby’s Best Friend.  
New York: Free Press. 
Hettrick, Scott (2000) Video Bows Mint Coin: Pic Franchises Mine 
Straight-to-Video Gold, Variety [online], 23 June.  Available at: 
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117782996.html [Accessed: 1 
October 2009] 
Knee, Jonathan, Bruce A. Greenwald and Ava Seave (2009) The Curse of 
the Mogul: What’s Wrong with the World’s Leading Media Companies.  
New York: Portfolio. 
Krämer, Peter (1998) Would You Take Your Child to See This Film?: The 
Cultural and Social Work of the Family Adventure Movie, in Steve Neale 
and Murray Smith (eds.), Contemporary Hollywood Cinema.  London: 
Routledge, 1998, pp. 294-311. 
______ (2002) “The Best Disney Film Never Made”: Children’s Films and 
The Family Audience in American Cinema Since the 1960s, in Steve Neale 
                                                   “Family Entertainment” and Contemporary Hollywood 
 
Issue 25, February 2013  19 
 
(ed.), Genre and Contemporary Hollywood.  London: BFI, 2002, pp. 185-
200. 
______ (2004) “It’s Aimed at Kids – The Kid in Everybody”: George 
Lucas, Star Wars and Children’s Entertainment, in Yvonne Tasker (ed.), 
Action and Adventure Cinema.  London: Routledge, 2004, pp. 358-370. 
______ (2006) Disney and Family Entertainment, in Linda Ruth Williams 
and Michael Hammond (eds.), Contemporary American Cinema.  
Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2006, pp. 265-271.   
Littleton, Cynthia (2010) Disney Reaches Deal for Miramax: Tutor Group 
to Pay $660 Million for Library, Name, Assets, Variety [online], 29 July.  
Available at: http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118022384.html 
[Accessed: 15 October 2010] 
Lyons, Charles and Cathy Dunkley (2002) Paramount, Producer in a 
Family Way, Variety [online], 14 April.  Available at:  
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117865423.html [Accessed: 19 
October 2009] 
Maltby, Richard (2003) Hollywood Cinema.  London: Blackwell. 
McClintock, Pamela (2010) Helmer to Haunt Disney’s “Mansion”: 
Guillermo del Toro to Develop, Direct Film, Variety [online], 22 July.  
Available at: http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118022085 [Accessed: 
22 November 2010] 
McLean, Thomas (2009) Family Fare Does Well in Down Market: In Tough 
Economy, Original DVD Titles Chug Along, Variety, 6 January, p. 22. 
McNary, Dave (2008) Fantasy Movies a Hit Overseas: “Compass” is Latest 
Family-Friendly Pic to Thrive, Variety [online], 3 March.  Available at: 
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117982057.html [Accessed: 28 
August 2009] 
Miller, Toby et al. (2005) Global Hollywood 2.  London: BFI Publishing. 
Moerk, Christian (1993) Family Volume at WB, Variety [online] 14 May.  
Available at:  http://www.variety.com/article/VR106838.html [Accessed: 
16 October 2009] 
Morris, Nigel (2007) The Cinema of Steven Spielberg: Empire of Light.  
London: Wallflower Press. 
Murphy, Ryan (1993) The Kids Are All Right: PG Flicks – “The Secret 
Garden” and “Free Willy” Are Among the Family-Oriented Films On Which 
Studios are Setting Their Sights, Entertainment Weekly [online] 16 April.  
Brown   
   
20   Issue 25, February 2013 
 
Available at: http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0,,20218929,00.html 
[Accessed: 29 October 2009] 
Neale, Steve (2000) Genre and Hollywood.  London: Routledge. 
New Plan to Put Warners in Family Way (1991) Variety, 9 December, pp. 
1, 3. 
Oei, Lily (2004) ABC, Disney Net in Kiddie Synergy: Quartet to Announce 
P’gramming Skeds, Variety [online], 17 March.  Available at: 
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117901865 [Accessed 1 November 
2009] 
O’Steen, Kathleen (1993) Matoian Makes Fox His Family, Variety [online], 
18 November.  Available at: 
http://www.variety.com/article/VR115672.html [Accessed: 16 October 
2009] 
Rickey, Carrie (2010) Americans Are Seeing Fewer and Few Foreign Films’, 
The Philadelphia Inquirer [online], 9 May.  Available at: 
http://www.philly.com/inquirer/entertainment/20100509_Americans_are_
seeing_fewer_and_fewer_foreign_films.html#axzz0r7gJ2McM [Accessed: 
17 June 2010] 
Sandler, Adam (1998) Feola Tops U Family Unit, Variety [online] 4 
February.  Available at: 
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117467391.html [Accessed 16 
October 2009] 
Shoard, Catherine (2010) Plot Twist: Film Based on Rubik’s Cube Heading 
for the Big Screen, The Guardian [online], 12 November.  Available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2010/nov/12/rubiks-cube-film-big-screen 
[Accessed: 22 November 2010] 
Snyder, Gabriel (2005) Don’t Give Me an “R”: Film Rating Slips in Light of 
Political Climate, Variety [online], 20 February.  Available at: 
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117918193.html [Accessed 19 
October 2009] 
Thelman, Sam (2008) High-End Toys are Aimed at Adults: Sales of Action 
Figures are Up 8% This Year, Variety [online], 22 February.  Available at: 
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117981311/ [Accessed: 30 September 
2009] 
Thompson, Kristin (2007) The Frodo Franchise: The Lord of the Rings and 
Modern Hollywood.  Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Tiemann, Amy (2007) Will the Transformers Movie Spark a Backlash from 
Parents?, CNET [online], 4 July.  Available at: 
                                                   “Family Entertainment” and Contemporary Hollywood 
 
Issue 25, February 2013  21 
 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13507_3-9739314-18.html [Accessed 26 
June 2012] 
2009 MPAA Theatrical Market Statistics (2009) Motion Picture Association 
of America. 
Walt Disney, UTV to Co-Produce Family Films (2011) The Economic Times 
[online], 19 May.  Available at:  
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-05-
19/news/29560457_1_hungama-tv-utv-motion-pictures-movie-production 
[Accessed: 31 October 2011] 
Wasko, Janet (1994) Hollywood in the Information Age: Beyond the Silver 
Screen.  Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Wasser, Frederick (2002) Veni, Vidi, Video: The Hollywood Empire and 
the VCR.  Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Waxman, Sharon (2004) Study Finds Film Ratings are Growing More 
Lenient, New York Times [online], 14 January.  Available at:  
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/14/movies/study-finds-film-ratings-
are-growing-more-lenient.html [Accessed: 24 August 2009] 
 
Filmography 
The Adventures of Tintin.  2011.  Dir. Steven Spielberg.  Paramount 
Pictures/Columbia Pictures. 
Aladdin.  1992.  Dir. Ron Clements, John Musker.  Walt Disney Pictures. 
Alice in Wonderland.  2010.  Dir. Tim Burton.  Walt Disney Pictures. 
Arjun: The Warrior Prince.  2012.  Dir. Arnab Chaudhuri.  Walt Disney 
Pictures. 
Avatar.  2009.  Dir. James Cameron.  20th Century Fox. 
The Avengers.  2012.  Dir. Joss Whedon.  Walt Disney Pictures. 
Chariots of Fire.  1981.  Dir. Hugh Hudson.  20th Century Fox. 
Beauty and the Beast.  1991.  Dir. Gary Trousdale, Kirk Wise.  Walt 
Disney Pictures. 
E.T.: The Extra-Terrestrial.  1982.  Dir. Steven Spielberg.  Universal 
Pictures.   
Brown   
   
22   Issue 25, February 2013 
 
Fantastic Four.  2005.  Dir. Tim Story.  20th Century Fox. 
Finding Neverland.  2004.  Dir. Marc Forster.  Miramax Films. 
The Golden Compass.  2007.  Dir. Chris Weitz.  New Line Cinema. 
Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix.  2007.  Dir. David Yates.  
Warner Bros. 
Hulk.  2003.  Dir. Ang Lee.  Universal Pictures. 
Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom.  1984.  Dir. Steven Spielberg.  
Paramount Pictures. 
The Little Mermaid.  1989.  Dir. Ron Clements, John Musker.  Walt Disney 
Pictures. 
The Lion King.  1994.  Dir. Roger Allers, Rob Minkoff.  Walt Disney 
Pictures. 
Mars Needs Moms.  2011.  Dir. Simon Wells.  Walt Disney Pictures. 
Pinocchio.  1940.  Dir. Ben Sharpsteen et al.  Walt Disney Pictures. 
Raiders of the Lost Ark.  1981.  Dir. Steven Spielberg.  Paramount 
Pictures. 
The Return of Jafar.  1994.  Dir. Tad Stones.  Walt Disney Pictures. 
Run Wild, Run Free.  1969.  Dir. Richard Sarafian.  Columbia Pictures. 
The Simpsons Movie.  2007.  Dir. David Silverman.  20th Century Fox. 
The Smurfs.  2011.  Dir. Raja Gosnell.  Columbia Pictures.  
The SpongeBob SquarePants Movie.  2004.  Dir. Stephen Hillenberg.  
Paramount Pictures. 
Star Wars.  1977.  Dir. George Lucas.  20th Century Fox. 
Superman Returns.  2006.  Dir. Bryan Singer.  Warner Bros. 
Toy Story.  1995.  Dir. John Lasseter.  Walt Disney Pictures. 
Transformers.  2007.  Dir. Michael Bay.  Paramount Pictures. 
2001: A Space Odyssey.  1968.  Dir. Stanley Kubrick.  MGM. 
X-Men.  2000.  Dir. Bryan Singer.  20th Century Fox. 
